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The Internet Direct Public Offering:
Establishing Trust in a
Disintermediated Capital Market
Jason Trainor†

Introduction

Whereas the process of financial intermediation was
once human capital and relationship intensive, 5 it is now
heavily influenced by technological innovation and consumer demand, factors which have tended to disrupt the
monopoly power of financial intermediaries.

S

mall- and medium-sized business enterprises (SMEs) 1
have consistently encountered difficulties in tapping
into the public equity markets in Canada. This problem
has been shaped by a number of economic, regulatory
and functional barriers to full participation by smaller
issuers in the Canadian capital market.
The fundamental dilemma involves reducing the
informational asymmetries between the private business
enterprise and its prospective public investors. For
smaller firms, the costs of disclosing firm-specific information to potential investors is substantial in relation to
the size of the investment. 2 Given the fundamental precept of securities regulation that investors must be
capable of making decisions based upon efficient, accurate and timely information, 3 it is necessary to consider
the sources through which information pertaining to
specific issuers is processed and distributed to the atomistic group of individuals and firms investing in the capital markets.
In the public offering context, a range of
intermediaries are involved in filtering large volumes of
information about the corporate issuer. The participation (or lack thereof) by these intermediaries creates a
number of costs and other barriers to effective participation. The most problematic of the traditional
intermediaries for small business finance has been the
investment bank.
Significant attention has recently been directed to
the possibility that the Internet can operate as an effective vehicle for small business financing. Setting aside the
excessive hyperbole concerning the ‘‘Internet revolution’’, it has nevertheless been consistently argued over
the preceding two decades that advances in information
technology will significantly impact the activities of the
institutions and private actors operating in the capital
markets. 4 Indeed, the technological disintermediation of
the capital markets should not be viewed as a revolution,
but rather as an evolutionary process that remains a
potentiality instead of a fully-developed instrumentality.

Technological innovation alone, however, is not sufficient to replace the institutions and actors that previously dominated the market for public offerings; rather,
the concept of disintermediation by definition creates a
vacuum that must be filled. Law firms and other
intermediaries can create additional value for their clients by assuming some or all of the tasks currently
apportioned to investment bankers in the public offering
process.
Theoretical models created within the field of
behavioural economics are useful in guiding securities
regulators, lawyers, and academics to a fuller understanding of the current limitations inhibiting the realization of a functioning disintermediated marketplace for
securities. Ultimately, the argument calls for the creation
of a market environment where the decreased cost component of a disintermediated offering is complemented
by reputational elements that import legitimacy into the
offering. As technology and the presence of other
intermediaries have replicated or avoided many of the
justifications for direct underwriter involvement in
smaller public offerings, it remains to be considered
whether such instruments and institutions are capable of
nurturing and sustaining the trust-based attributes of
traditional reputational intermediaries. Effective disintermediation in the securities markets will remain an
elusive objective as long as the impediments to the development of trust remain in place.
At a broader level, a responsible approach to the
access to capital problem should reflect the belief that a
properly functioning market is an instrument of social
control capable of influencing broader social objectives
(as opposed to being an institution with an insular focus
responsive only to the needs of its participants). 6 A more
efficient capital market providing enhanced access for
smaller issuers can contribute meaningfully to the eco-
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nomic welfare of the greater society. A coherent proposal
for regulatory reform and institutional development
must balance the competing objectives of offering
enhanced access to capital for small businesses while not
exacerbating the market risk posed to investors by such
developments.
A brief examination of the problem of informational asymmetry is followed by a look at the economic
and regulatory costs imposed upon smaller issuers. This
paper then turns to an examination of the ‘‘functional’’
inhibitors to growth posed by the role of traditional
market intermediaries and reviews the concept of disintermediation, focusing on the promise of the Internet
direct public offering as a means of achieving a functionally disintermediated securities market and the obstacles
currently impeding the realization of that goal. Finally,
this paper looks at the lack of trust as the ‘‘weakest link’’
in the disintermediation edifice, and proposes a workable means for establishing trust in the disintermediated
marketplace.

Informational Asymmetry

A

lthough present in numerous types of markets,
informational asymmetries are particularly pronounced in financial markets. The information asymmetry dilemma attempts to explain and confront the
potential for distorted incentives in the capital markets
where one party to a financial transaction has information that another party is lacking. 7 The classic exposition
of the theory considers the process of exposing ‘‘lemons’’
in a group of used automobiles. 8 The automobile market
is one in which goods are sold both honestly and dishonestly, with the seller being the only party who has true
knowledge of the quality of the automobile. The individual purchaser may or may not be cheated, depending
on the honesty of the seller and/or the purchaser’s ability
to identify quality in such an environment. Moreover,
the process has broader implications for the entire
market. The existence of sellers capable of exercising
dishonesty in their dealings tends to drive honest dealers
and their automobiles out of the marketplace. 9
In the public offering context, the problem of information asymmetry arises when prospective investors are
faced with incomplete information about a company in
which they must decide whether to invest. For SMEs,
information about the company typically remains in the
hands of company insiders. This circle of knowledge
may be more or less exclusive depending on the size,
corporate governance structure, and previous financing
activities of the enterprise. Indeed, the problem faced by
new issuers lies somewhere along the informational efficiency continuum between a market in which buyers
must attribute value to a nebulous ‘‘black box’’ 10 and
that of an efficient, well-informed marketplace for the
prospective issuer’s capital. Without credible sources of
information about the company’s past performance and
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future prospects, or some objective mechanism for measuring the quality of information disclosure, the investor
is left without a legitimate basis for attributing value to
the company’s securities. The result is a tendency for
investors to discount credible information and place a
relative premium on corrupt sources of information,
with securities prices ultimately reflecting the average
(lower) quality of information. 11 The choices available to
the issuer may therefore be predetermined by the degree
of information ‘‘opaqueness’’ that confronts the investor:
small, start-up enterprises tend to be most informationally opaque while larger, more seasoned issuers gravitate
toward more transparent positions on the continuum. 12
Larger issuers with public share listings are the most
informationally transparent, having expanded their
formal corporate governance structure and increased
their level of market disclosure, first through private
sources of finance and later through the public offering
process.
A more benign manifestation of the informational
asymmetry problem exists in the secondary markets.
Assuming one accepts the postulates of efficient capital
market theory, 13 existing market disclosure contributes
to the accurate pricing of securities, at least partially
negating the problem of informational asymmetry.
lnformational efficiency is presumed to be more pronounced in the market for seasoned offerings, a finding
that has been reflected in the reduced regulatory burdens of ‘‘POP’’ 14 and Shelf 15 offerings. 16
The information asymmetry inherent in the bilateral relationship between issuer and investor has mandated the intervention of third party intermediaries to
temper the impact of informational deficiencies in the
market for initial public offerings. Issuers must therefore
encounter direct and indirect costs and other barriers in
attempts to utilize the resources provided by the various
intermediaries. The following sections examine the
various ‘‘inhibitors’’ to public financing that confront the
prospective issuer in its attempt to raise capital.

The Small Business Capital Barrier:
Regulatory and Economic
Inhibitors to Growth
The small business capital barrier

S

mall businesses in Canada have faced significant difficulties in maintaining adequate levels of capitalization to finance their operations. 17 Commonly referred to
as the ‘‘small business capital barrier’’, the phenomenon
has inhibited the growth of SMEs in Canada. Indeed,
undercapitalization has been cited as one of the primary
causes of business failure in start-up enterprises. 18 Small
businesses face disproportionately high barriers to public
equity financing than larger issuers. This is reflected in
the higher marginal cost of capital for small offerings 19
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based upon the high fixed costs of the offering process
and the costs associated with satisfying the regulatory
burdens of a public offering.
For the purposes of this article, the traditional attributes of the small business capital barrier are divided into
three categories, which are referred to as ‘‘inhibitors’’.
The first is composed of regulatory inhibitors and is
comprised of the numerous obstacles presented by the
existing regime of securities regulation. The second
focuses on economic inhibitors, which involve the direct
and indirect costs imposed upon an issuer who attempts
to ‘‘go public’’. Finally, there are what can be termed
‘‘functional’’ inhibitors. This category examines the functions of the IPO process traditionally delegated by issuers
to third party intermediaries. After this paper presents
some insight into the new technologies that have acted
to ‘‘disintermediate’’ the market for initial public offerings, a fourth category is revealed: the ‘‘reputational’’
inhibitor.

Regulatory inhibitors
The securities regulation regime in Canada has created some significant regulatory barriers that have traditionally prevented or otherwise discouraged smaller
companies from successfully raising funds on the public
markets.
Before being permitted to distribute 20 securities to
the public, a prospective issuer must satisfy a number of
regulatory requirements, including the provincial registration 21 and prospectus 22 requirements, 23 which can be
expensive and time consuming and typically require the
retention of outside experts. 24 The process can be long
and sometimes tedious, as the drafters must attempt to
assuage the competing demands of the parties to the
transaction as well as the regulatory authorities. There
may be several drafts of a prospectus document before
the filing of the preliminary prospectus as well as during
the period between the filing of the preliminary prospectus and the approval of the final prospectus by provincial securities regulators. 25
The registration and prospectus requirements must
be satisfied in all provincial jurisdictions in which the
securities will be distributed. 26 The issuer is also
expected to satisfy the listing requirements of the
exchange on which the securities will be listed. 27
The requirements pertaining to the disclosure of
audited financial statements have also had an impact
upon smaller issuers, although securities regulators have
exhibited some flexibility in this area. 28
Satisfaction of the various regulatory provisions contributes significantly to the second inhibitor, which
focuses on the costs of the process.

Economic inhibitors
Issuers planning to conduct a public offering are
subject to significant financial expenses, many of which
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relate to satisfying the regulatory requirements of the
offering process. It is important to recognize that many
of these expenses are fixed costs and as such disproportionately impact upon smaller issuers. The various economic inhibitors can be broken down into direct and
indirect costs.
Direct costs
Direct costs to an issuer in a traditional public
offering consist of the costs incurred by the retention of
intermediaries (lawyers, auditors, underwriters, etc.), and
other miscellaneous direct expenditures necessary to
complete the offering. Legal and accounting costs have
been estimated at approximately $200,000 to $400,000. 29
The issuer also faces direct expenses in the form of the
printing costs associated with a paper-based prospectus
and other offering materials. 30 The largest single expense,
however, is that levied by the underwriter, which typically charges a variable amount determined as a percentage of the offering price, usually in the range of
4 to 9 per cent , along with additional fees for disbursements and other matters. 31 The total direct costs to the
issuer for a public offering of less than $5 million have
been estimated to be 22.6 per cent of the issue proceeds. 32 This can be contrasted with the average total
cost for IPOs between $5 million and $10 million, which
have been estimated to amount to approximately 12
per cent of the offering. 33 Larger offerings feature even
smaller proportions of the total cost being devoted to
underwriting fees. 34
Indirect costs
One of the largest indirect costs to an issuer is created by the tendency for new issues to be underpriced.
In essence, the problem explains the prevalent practice in
which the offering price for securities is artificially set
below the anticipated equilibrium price in the
aftermarket. 35 Initially understood as an anomaly, the
underpricing phenomenon has consistently found
empirical support in financial and legal literature, 36 and
has been widely recognized as a selling technique by
underwriters attempting to sell the maximum amount
of securities possible. The technique has been criticized
as one of the more potent manifestations of the shortterm incentive structure of the contemporary capital
markets. 37 The problem is most prevalent when the
offering is distributed to the public in a firm-commitment, 38 fixed-price offering. The dynamics of this form
of offering create incentives for the underwriters to sell
underwritten securities as soon as possible in order to
shield themselves from adverse market or issuer-related
developments that can affect the price of the securities. 39
As a result, the securities are typically sold to institutional
investors upon whom the underwriters and their brokerage appendages can rely as an expedient source of
high-volume sales. Compounding the problem for SMEs
is the fact that underpricing tends to be most acute in
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the case of ‘‘riskier’’ offerings. 40 In Canada, the problem
has been verified by a number of researchers, whose
findings have for the most part mirrored those in other
industrialized countries. 41
Brief mention should also be made of the long-term
correlate of the underpricing phenomenon:
underperformance. Empirical studies have shown that
the long-run performance of IPOs has tended to be
weak, 42 often underperforming against non-IPO securities when both classes of investments are tracked over
the same time period, 43 although recent studies have
indicated otherwise. 44 The long-run performance question nevertheless remains important, given that the longterm performance of the equity markets has been found
to influence the investing patterns of most investors. 45
The combined effect of underwriter influence in
short-term underpricing and long-term
underperformance is that issuers receive a lower receipt
price for their securities, 46 institutional investors (and
other highly sophisticated actors) are permitted to benefit at the expense of ordinary investors, 47 and underwriters retain supranormal profits. The inefficiencies in
the IPO market can also act to discourage privately-held
companies from making the jump to the public equity
markets. It has been suggested that if IPOs were priced at
closer to their expected long-term value, the market
would be hospitable to greater IPO activity, since public
offerings would be willingly undertaken by issuers and
underwriters at more points in the market cycle. 48 Ultimately, the inefficiencies represent a distortion of the
productive allocation of goods and services in the
economy. 49
Another indirect issuer expense relates to the opportunity cost of diverted management time and effort. The
company’s senior management must devote a significant
volume of manpower to the task of preparing the company for the offering. Recent estimates have suggested
that an IPO can consume approximately 20 weeks of
senior management time, which can be calculated as
costing up to an additional 7 per cent of the offering
price. 50 This diversion of management attention often
occurs during a crucial stage of the company’s development, 51 and can have a significant negative impact on a
small company that does not have sufficient management depth to simultaneously attend to other important
aspects of the company’s operations.
Moreover, smaller companies are often subject to
costs arising from structural and other changes to the
business prompted by comments in ‘‘deficiency’’ letters
drafted by securities regulators in the prospectus
approval process, a factor that can also create substantial
delays in the offering process. 52 Finally, a company that
successfully completes a public offering becomes immediately subject to the ongoing costs of regulatory compliance stemming from the continuous disclosure obligations of the securities regulatory regime.
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In sum, the public offering process is a costly
burden that many small businesses cannot afford to bear.
Such concerns prompted the recent OSC Task Force on
Small Business Financing to conclude that the offering
process ‘‘cannot be a cost-effective way of raising less
than $2-3 million’’. 53
The preclusive nature of IPO expenses for smaller
issuers also has impacts that can be felt beyond the individual issuer. Viewed through a financial growth cycle
paradigm in which different capital structures and
financing strategies are optimal at different points in the
life cycle of a business, 54 the effects of the current model
of small business financing also have potential negative
effects on the welfare of market intermediaries. Successful small business ventures may ultimately require
intermediated sources of capital. As a business venture
matures beyond the point at which early-stage small
business loans, ‘‘angel’’ financing, 55 and venture capitalist
funding can provide sources of capital that are adequate
to their current or expected needs, the next logical step is
to take the company public. The preclusive nature of the
current process acts to dissuade contemplative issuers
from attempting to go public. This contributes to the
stultification of the new issues market for SMEs, and
creates fewer opportunities for the market intermediaries
who might otherwise assist such an endeavour. Moreover, the availability of a vibrant IPO market for SMEs
has been proven to stimulate the involvement of earlystage financing intermediaries by providing them with a
viable exit strategy, which is an attractive feature for
private equity investors who may be concerned about
being locked into a particular investment for an
extended period of time. 56 This factor in turn contributes to lowering the cost of capital during the earlier
stage.
More importantly, the chilling effect on the IPO
market can have much broader effects on the economy
as a whole, given the fundamental importance of small
businesses in innovation, job creation, and the general
health and stability of the economy. 57 Small businesses
are vital to economic development and contribute disproportionately to employment and growth. 58 As a
result, the availability of cost-effective public equity
financing and the institutions that are capable of facilitating this form of fundraising can contribute meaningfully to the long-run performance of the economy. 59

‘‘Functional’’ Inhibitors: Market
Intermediaries

A

s the previous section has identified, the direct costs
incurred by issuers in a public offering are heavily
influenced by the retention of certain types of intermediation services that have traditionally been considered a
functional necessity in overcoming informational asym-
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metries in the capital markets. While acknowledging
that financial market intermediaries fulfill a range of
functions in the public offering process, the focus here is
on the effects of these third-party institutions in reducing
the informational barriers between the primary participants. Third party intermediaries fulfill two inter-related
functions in redressing the problem of informational
asymmetry: first, by facilitating the flow of information
about a particular security, and second, by confirming
the credibility of information flowing from the prospective issuer to the investing public. It must also be recognized that the various market intermediaries perform
other functions that are not directly related to overcoming informational barriers, and brief mention is
made of such functions where appropriate. After
exploring the general role of intermediaries in the capital
markets, the focus of this part shifts to the role of the
underwriter in the offering process, given that the costs
incurred by their participation or, paradoxically, their
refusal to participate in the process, has traditionally
presented the most significant impediment to capital
raising by smaller issuers. Brief mention is also made of
the role of other intermediaries in the offering process.
The criticisms pertaining to the costs and other inefficiencies engendered by the participation of various
market intermediaries in the public offering process have
often been accompanied by suggestions to alter the traditional roles played by these actors. Indeed, it has been
suggested that issuers can benefit from the elimination
of third parties who are positioned between the enterprise and its investors. The Internet direct public offering
has received great attention as a potential means of
achieving that end. Before examining the utility of the
Internet offering process, it is necessary to explore the
functional rationale for third party intermediation in the
market for public offerings.

Intermediation
The traditional rationale for intermediation is based
upon the simple fact that an issuing company cannot be
entrusted to fulfill certain core functions of the offering
process. Although it can attempt to produce and disseminate information intended for investors, it cannot provide an objective measure of certification. In other words,
aside from the securities law requirement that the issuer
provide a certificate pronouncing full, plain and true
disclosure, 60 it cannot credibly prove to investors that the
company’s disclosure data is reliable and accurate before
the information is disseminated to solicit interest in the
company’s securities. Moreover, the problem facing the
issuer can be deeper than mere certification. The incentive for truthful disclosure might not only be lacking, but
there might actually be perverse incentives to misrepresent the true state of the company’s affairs in order to
reap the benefits of an inflated offering price. Simply
stated, there can be tangible benefits to the issuer for
exaggerating the positive attributes of the company’s
finances and operations, and similar rewards for mini-
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mizing the true value of liabilities and other negative
aspects of the business. The absence of credible information about the prospective issuer or some objective
mechanism for measuring the quality of information disclosure prevents investors from making informed decisions about the company’s securities. 61 Credible information transfer therefore emerges as a prerequisite to an
efficient and effective securities market.
Intermediaries have traditionally assumed an
important role in transferring information from the
issuer to the investor, thereby rectifying the incapacity of
the corporate principal to screen for quality. The intermediary possesses the capability to impartially evaluate
issuer data and can assume a prominent position
between issuers and investors. The existence of a credible
intermediary can emit a ‘‘signal’’ to investors that the
issuer for which it has processed and certified information exhibits quality and thus its securities are a worthy
investment (relative to the investment preferences of the
investor). The process contributes to substantially
reducing the search costs faced by investors.
A crude analogy in the strict bilateral context might
be drawn to the consumer product warranty, where the
existence of a warranty, and moreover, its terms (in comparison to the warranty terms of other similar products),
can reduce the ultimate costs of assessing product quality
for consumers wishing to purchase the product. 62 Warranties have proven to be an effective alternative method
of signaling quality in situations where verifiable disclosure is costly or impossible in a marketplace of risk
averse consumers. 63
To the extent that the intermediary possesses the
capabilities and incentives to accurately evaluate the
informational and behavioural components of the
issuer’s business, investors will be willing to pay a premium for the issuer’s securities, and issuers will be
willing to compensate the intermediary accordingly. 64 It
has been suggested that an issuer will therefore be
willing to pay a premium for certification services where
the revenue arising from the market’s acknowledgment
of certified (and therefore presumably accurate) information exceeds the cost difference imposed on the issuer by
retaining the services of the intermediary. 65 In reality,
however, the choice is not that simple. As a subsequent
section of this paper makes apparent, the market for
intermediary services does not always permit the issuer
to make that choice. 66
While the terms ‘‘intermediary’’ and ‘‘gatekeeper’’
are often used interchangeably, the two functions have
distinct characteristics. An ‘‘intermediary’’ is a more generalized concept, referring simply to third parties that
perform intermediation services between two or more
actors. The process may be passive or active, but does not
require the formal participation of the third party in
influencing the behaviour or disclosure of the principal.
The term ‘‘gatekeeper’’, however, connotes a more active
and participatory role for a third party intermediary. As
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gatekeeper, the intermediary moves beyond the role of
behaviour that can range from ‘‘fraud-on-the-intermemere middleman to become an active guardian of the
diary’’ to third-party negligence, and formal ex post sancrights and interests of other actors that are external to the
tions for this form of gatekeeper failure should attempt
immediate intermediary — principal relationship. The
to reflect its true nature. This problem invites a considergatekeeper positions itself between the principal and
ation of whether liability should appropriately shift to
other actors and exercises its power to intervene or
the party whose acts are most culpable, with formal or
efuse to intervene in an attempt to alter the incentives
informal sanctions dependant on the position of the
the principal or protect the interests of others. The
negligent or malfeasant intermediary on the liability conncept of responsibility is therefore coincident with the
tinuum.
fillment of the gatekeeping role. The gatekeeper is
Finally, there remains the ultimate intangible variponsible for maintaining the principal’s compliance
able: gatekeeper fallibility. Even an underwriter’s or
h accepted norms and quality standards. These norms
auditor’s most innovative financial modelling and
standards are context specific and are as much a
accounting practices might attribute an inaccurate value
tion of the particular market for gatekeeping serto an issuer and its financial position, and a securities
as the market for the goods or services of the prinlawyer’s most comprehensive due diligence investigation
can overlook a crucial liability issue. The intermediary
must be understood as the aggregate of its human and
n effective third party enforcement strategy
technological components. Human error, while to be
of successfully certifying the informational
strenuously
avoided, can ultimately occur. This cannot
or altering the behaviour of the principal must
be
easily
accounted
for in evaluating the services of the
an enforceable duty upon the intermediary
intermediary,
lest
the
fallibility of an individual firm or
s it to avert misconduct by the principal when
source
of
intermediation
be frequently manifest. Simi67 or, in the alternative, disavow their role
as
larly,
the
integrity
of a technological system or device is
gatekeeper. In the presence of an enforceable duty, the
rarely
beyond
reproach.
Faced with the inevitable
necessary ex ante gatekeeper enforcement/certification
absence of human and technological perfection, the
strategy can therefore be understood as a more benign
appropriate system of gatekeeper protection must be
variant of the primal ‘‘fight or flight’’ mechanism in
capable
of tolerating some deviation from absolute accuwhich an organism is forced to respond when thrust into
racy.
ituations that heighten its exposure to dangerous conseex ante gatekeeping
It also bears mention that the
quences. 68 Intermediaries faced with a poor quality (or
function is not limited to the private sphere. Rather, a
corrupt) issuer can either cope with the situation by
range of public and quasi-public institutions, including
forcing the principal to conform to their expectations, or
securities regulators, stock markets, self-regulatory orgathe third-party can withdraw its services. 69 For example,
nizations, and the courts continue to play a meaningful
an accountant or lawyer can withhold an audit letter or
role in exercising the gatekeeping function in contempolegal opinion, or the underwriter can refuse to distribute
rary securities markets. Unlike private intermediaries, the
the offering. 70 The existence of an enforceable duty
gatekeeping functions of public intermediaries fulfill
introduces the notion that gatekeeper responsibility necboth ex ante and ex post functions. Examples of ex ante
essarily incorporates a substantial element of self-interest,
gatekeeping include such functions as prospectus review
as the gatekeeper must protect itself from externalized
by securities regulators and the listing standards and
threats posed by the behaviour of the principal or risk
application procedures enforced by stock exchanges.
the possibility of sanction.
Obvious examples of ex post gatekeeping include regulaMoreover, the existence of an intermediary need
tory sanctions such as the broad public interest sancnot necessarily be an accurate signal of quality. While
tions, 73 statutory civil liability for misrepresentation in a
intermediation has the capacity for redressing the inforprospectus, 74 common law causes of action, 75 and the
mational barriers in the securities markets, the presence
delisting and cease-trade orders imposed by stock
of intermediation per se is not sufficient to conclude that
exchanges.
Their formal roles remain essential to an
the problems have been resolved. 71 Indeed, there remain
effective gatekeeping strategy and must be adapted to
a number of potentialities that are capable of lessening
any revised gatekeeper strategy that might be devised.
the ultimate credibility of the gatekeeper function. The
first is the possibility that a corrupt principal can ‘‘shop
the market’’ for a compliant gatekeeper or otherwise
Gatekeeper liability regimes
attempt to corrupt an otherwise legitimate gatekeeper. 72
It is important to emphasize that the enforcement
Second, the possibility exists that the principal can
and certification functions of gatekeeping services can be
dupe an unsuspecting intermediary. In such a case, the
enhanced through the imposition of juristic and/or prigatekeeper might have been duly diligent in its inspecvate liability mechanisms. While gatekeepers are
tion of the principal, but has been misled or otherwise
intended to monitor and alter the behaviour of the prindeceived into certifying information that is false. This
cipals under their watchful eye, an appropriate gatetype of occurrence falls somewhere on a spectrum of
keeper liability regime must also exist to monitor the
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imperfections that have been internalized within the
various intermediary functions.
Where the threat of direct sanction against the principal proves to be an ineffective deterrent, collateralized
liability regimes (both formal and informal) can compensate the ineffectual mechanisms for enforcing primary
liability. Direct deterrence, for example, is often conceived as a poor strategy for enforcing legal norms where
the principal actors lack the capacity to make self-interested compliance decisions. 76 Furthermore, the principal
actors may plot their present and future course of action
with reference to a risk–reward paradigm in which the
potential benefits to be gained from inarticulate disclosure or other variances from expected standards of behaviour are calculated to outweigh the potential sanctions
arising from detection. Although it has been suggested
that the imposition of a regime featuring severe penalties
is the obvious choice for countering such imperfections,
a variety of constraints militate against the effectiveness
of severity. 77 Severe penalties might appear to be an
effective deterrent, but the residual value of a principal
entity’s assets might effectively preclude recovery (absent
a persuasive case for piercing the corporate veil in the
most egregious of cases or the imposition of criminal or
quasi-criminal sanctions against the directing or managing minds of the corporation), and the imposition of
severe punitive measures might disproportionately harm
the ‘‘innocents’’: the employees, creditors, and other
stakeholder groups that constitute the wider constituency of the principal. 78

Moreover, a singular reliance on ex post supervision
of issuer disclosure and behaviour ignores the positive
incentives that an ex ante gatekeeping strategy can
encourage prior to the commission of activities that
might ultimately be subject to an ex post sanction, possibly exposing the ‘‘victims’’ of such behaviour to unnecessary loss and little chance for restitution. The liability
imposed upon gatekeepers coincides with their responsibility for monitoring the behaviour and informational
integrity of the issuer, recognizing potential failures
within the issuer’s own internal procedures, and pressuring the issuer to forego misleading investors or otherwise obfuscating the quality of information or behaviour
of the corporation. 79 This form of ex ante screening
mechanism is preferable to a singular reliance on liability
mechanisms that target the issuer after an investment
has been made in its securities.
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Equally important, however, are the private inducements
to gatekeeper responsibility, forces that impose a private
sphere of gatekeeper liability upon market
intermediaries.
Ultimately, the success of an intermediary in disclosing analytical information about the issuer permits
other market participants to make an ex post determination of the intermediary’s credibility. 80 Herein lies the
most effective and most persistent means of ensuring
that the gatekeeper fulfills its responsibilities to external
actors. The credibility of the intermediary’s past provision of gatekeeping services becomes reconstituted into
gatekeeper reputation, properly understood as a valuable
yet intangible measure of accuracy and credibility.
Because the issuer and the intermediary make significant investments (each within their own sphere of
expertise) in informational credibility, each hold a
reputational stake in the outcome (measured through
the ultimate valuation of the principal entity’s securities,
relative to the quality of initial and subsequent informational disclosure), and each would be expected to gravitate toward openness and integrity. Principal actors
invest in firm-specific reputational investments, such as
advertising and brand identification, 81 while
intermediaries invest in reputation through a self-perpetuating cycle of credible commitments to informational
integrity. 82 However, as the previous discussion has outlined, there is a disjuncture between the incentives and
corresponding reputational sanctions for the principal
and intermediary in this context. Given that an intermediary exists solely to assist principal entities in accessing
the resources of participants that are extraneous to the
principal — intermediary relationship, the reputational
costs to the intermediary for improperly screening the
principal are ultimately higher. In the capital markets
context, an intermediary (such as an investment bank),
by its very nature intends to be a repeat player in the
capital markets, and thus bears the risk that its reputaex ante
tion will be tarnished through improper
screening leading to negative ex post results for investors.
Their market reputation thus acts as a conditional surrogate for credibility; the reputation of the intermediary is
strategically held as a ‘‘hostage’’ in exchange for assurances of quality. 83 A veneer of gatekeeper vulnerability is
therefore exposed, as its reputational capital becomes
interwoven with the credibility of the principal. The
failure of the principal to uphold its end of the informational bargain (as verified by the intermediary), subjects
the hostage to reputational sanction. Simply stated, the
services of the intermediary are subsequently devalued,
reducing its utility as a gatekeeper in an informationally
asymmetrical marketplace, with the ultimate penalty
being the reluctance of ostensibly credible principals
from retaining its services.

The primary foundation for a gatekeeper liability
regime is grounded in the regulatory environment
hrough which the intermediaries operate. Simply put,
atekeepers are constrained from absolving themselves
their responsibility to monitor and enforce the actions
the principal actors by the protections afforded to the
ividuals situated externally to the principal and interdiary relationship. As mentioned previously, the reguIt must be remembered that the formal liability
y state ensures that investors are afforded a modregime does not disappear, but is rather reduced to a
m of protection against gatekeeper negligence.
secondary role limited to other forms of
ex ante deter-
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rence and ex post policing efforts. The principal (issuer)
and intermediaries remain subject to liability for misrepresenting the quality of the principal. Nevertheless, the
reputational argument illustrates that the private sphere
may in fact be the primary ordering mechanism that
‘‘regulates’’ the market for gatekeeper services. Any
responsible recommendation for reform must therefore
be predicated on altering the private incentive structures
that predominate in the market for intermediary services. This subject is explored in greater detail later in
this paper, where it is revealed that other intermediaries
are capable of developing sufficient reputational capital
to act as a surrogate for existing gatekeepers currently
entrenched in the market for advisory services relating to
public offerings.
The analysis in this section first provides a brief
glance at the specific services provided by intermediaries
currently operating in the capital markets. The primary
emphasis is on the role of investment banking services,
although the services of other intermediaries such as
lawyers and auditors are also discussed.

Investment banks and the underwriting
process
The underwriter’s role
An ‘‘underwriter’’ 84 can be defined as the division of
an investment banking firm that assists a prospective
issuer in the process of distributing its securities in the
public market through either purchasing the issuer’s
securities with a view to selling them (a firm-commitment underwriting) or by entering into a negotiated
agreement to assist the issuer in selling the securities (an
agency underwriting). The process itself may be undertaken by a single investment banking firm or a group of
firms led by a managing or lead underwriter operating as
a syndicate. 85 In essence, the retention of investment
banking services by companies seeking access to funds in
the capital markets is a matter of ‘‘hiring the money’’. 86
Underwriters are subject to the registration requirements
under provincial securities legislation, 87 and are independently regulated by self-regulatory organizations. In
Canada, they are regulated by the Investment Dealers’
Association and must conduct their business in a
manner consistent with the by-laws, rules and regulations of the Association. 88
A range of functions have been accorded to the
underwriter in the public offering process. Two such
functions are most important for the purposes of this
paper: the agency function and the due diligence function. The agency function refers to the underwriter’s role
in pricing, marketing, and selling the offering. 89 The
agency function also involves the provision of advisory
services for companies contemplating an offering, which
includes an initial ‘‘merit review’’ on behalf of the company to determine whether its securities are worthy of a
public offering. 90 The initial advisory assistance provided
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by an intermediary such as an investment bank can be
essential for SMEs, since such companies typically lack
the necessary sophistication to price and otherwise structure deals. 91
The agency function also contemplates the actual
selling of the company’s securities, a process that
includes marketing activities such as ‘‘road shows’’ in
which the investment bankers and senior executives of
the company travel to significant markets in order to
extol the virtues of the offering to potential investors. 92
This is an important event in the life cycle of the
offering, as it is at this stage that the investment bankers
solicit interest from (predominantly institutional) investors. In firm-commitment offerings, the agency activities
also contemplate a ‘‘risk-bearing’’ function, through
which the underwriter assumes the risk of not selling the
full complement of securities subject to the offering. 93
The due diligence function focuses on the ability of
the underwriter to certify the ‘‘veracity’’ of issuer disclosure under the securities laws. 94 It is at this stage that the
reputational element of the intermediary’s services plays
a prominent role. In offering its ‘‘seal of approval’’ 95 to
the issuer by certifying its informational disclosure, the
investment bank contributes to the success of the
offering by ‘‘renting’’ its reputation to the issuer. 96
An additional function performed by the underwriter in the public offering context is the provision of
after-market support following the offering. After-market
support services include the creation and maintenance of
liquidity in the market for the issuer’s securities, the
preparation of research reports, and the encouragement
of ongoing analyst coverage of the securities by the
research appendages of the investment banking institution.
Problems for SMEs arising from the underwriter’s
role
The traditional need for underwriter participation
in the public offering process is highly problematic for
SMEs hoping to raise public funds. Beyond the purely
economic issues raised earlier in this paper, 97 a number
of other factors suggest that the participation (or lack
thereof) by an underwriter places substantial limitations
on the ultimate success of the financing activities of a
smaller corporate entity.
Perhaps foremost among such factors is the reluctance of investment banks to underwrite smaller issues
of securities. 98 This problem is most acute in the case of
‘‘prestigious’’ investment banking institutions, 99 which
are least likely to devote human resources and reputational capital to a smaller offering. 100 Empirical studies
have proven that competition among investment
banking firms is relatively weak, 101 and that there is even
less competition in the market for smaller offerings.
Compounding the problem is the lack of a developed
distribution network of dealers specializing in smaller-
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scale financings. 102 A corresponding problem from the
point of view of the ordinary investor relates to the
inability of unpreferred retail investors to have any
meaningful participation in underwritten IPOs. 103 Most
retail investors are limited to purchasing the shares of
IPOs of any sized company in the secondary market.
The net effect of the various factors is the creation of
an enormous barrier to entry into the market for public
equity capital. This ultimately forces smaller firms either
to abandon the prospect of public equity fundraising or
to accept an inefficient outcome in the event that they
are able to secure the support of an investment bank.

Other intermediaries
A range of other intermediaries exist in the new
issues market that attempt to create value 104 for prospective issuers. This section will briefly review the current
role of lawyers, auditors, and private equity in the public
offering process.
Securities lawyers create value for their clients
(which can be either the investment bank or the issuer
in a public offering) by conducting a due diligence investigation and advising on what constitutes acceptable disclosure. 105 The responsibilities coincident with such a
role extend beyond fidelity to the client to an appreciation for the role of disclosure in a fair and efficient
securities market, a factor that has been reflected in the
following statement by Stanley Beck, a former Commissioner of the Ontario Securities Commission:
. . . the securities lawyer is arguably enforcing the terms of
the Act and is clearly the person upon whom the Commission, the financial community, and the investing public is
heavily dependent. I am sure that there are many practitioners that do not care to have the matter put quite that
way, but I suggest that it is in fact the truth of the matter. 106

The securities lawyer plays a central role in the
preparation of the prospectus document, which forms
the ultimate basis for disclosure in the offering. The
exercise of the due diligence investigation by a sophisticated securities lawyer has been honed into model verification procedures which have been described as being
‘‘almost as operational as the bouncer’s duty to check the
identification of underage patrons’’. 107 The ability to
create value for clients has been described as an important attribute of a skilled business lawyer, 108 and it is in
the public offering context that the securities lawyer consistently achieves this objective. 109
Auditors also fulfill a gatekeeping role in the public
offering process. The auditor is typically the first intermediary to develop a relationship with a prospective issuer,
having performed a variety of accounting tasks for the
company long before the decision to go public. Even if
the auditor has no such long-term relationship with the
company, it is nevertheless one of the first parties to
inspect the financial affairs of the company. An initial
public offering cannot proceed without the existence of
an auditor’s opinion in the formal disclosure documents,
and the underwriter typically requires a comfort letter

from the auditor to provide assurances in respect of the
prospective issuer’s financial condition. 110 Lawyers and
auditors are subject to similar statutory sanctions as
underwriters in respect of the disclosure of information
to investors.
Finally, the role of private equity should not be
discounted in any consideration of intermediaries in the
public offering process for SMEs. Private sources of
equity investment, such as venture capital firms and
angel investors, can operate as a springboard to the eventual acquisition of funds in the public equity markets.
Venture capitalists (VCs) provide more than financial
support to start-up entities; rather, they provide substantial managerial guidance in the early stages of the life
cycle of the business. Like the investment banker,
auditor and business lawyer, the VC is a repeat player in
the capital markets and furthermore has a high degree of
specialized expertise at small-firm finance and development. The venture capital firm typically makes a substantial investment in a start-up company, nurturing it
throughout its incubation stages and preparing it for an
eventual public offering through which the VC can
realize the full potential of its investment. 111 The prior
existence of venture capitalist funding in an SME can
have a tremendous impact on certifying the initial disclosure of a prospective issuer, given the VC’s investments in
reputational capital and the financial guidance and information production previously undertaken on behalf of
the issuer. 112

Disintermediation and the Internet
DPO

T

he problems inherent in the current institutional
structure of the capital markets presents significant
barriers for SMEs seeking to tap the public equity markets and has led to suggestions that alternative methods
of fundraising must be developed. The elimination or
reduction of the small issuer’s dependence on
intermediaries through technological disintermediation
is often cited as a workable solution. The most recent
manifestation has been the Internet direct public
offering (DPO). This section examines the rationale for
disintermediation and explores the possibility that an
Internet DPO can mitigate many of the current economic and functional barriers to growth.

Disintermediation
A commentator recently defined disintermediation
as ‘‘the rather ungainly term that is used in cyber circles
to describe the bypassing of middlemen that technology
allows, the circumventing of those who traditionally
stand between us and the things we desire’’. 113 The term
has found application beyond the capital markets context in areas ranging from e-commerce, 114 banking 115
and advertising, to the music industry, 116 higher education, 117 the provision of health care services, 118 and the
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ability of governments to accurately tax their residents. 119
The concept contemplates the elimination or reduction
of barriers to entry and transactional expenses imposed
upon parties by the necessity to transact through the
services of an intermediary. Its current popularity is
owed to the promise of technological progress as the
instrumentality for realizing its objectives.
Gatekeeping services create a series of costs that
must be borne by the principal actors operating within
the marketplace for gatekeeper services. Although their
purpose is to create the conditions for the positive development of their principals, the services of the intermediary can also operate to the detriment of the principal.
Direct costs must be incurred as a matter of course, but
adverse indirect costs also result from the provision of
gatekeeping services. In Akerlof’s market for ‘‘lemons’’,
the private market intermediaries created to increase the
welfare of market participants have adverse social costs.
Through their attempts to centralize information for the
atomistic market participants, these private institutions
become concentrations of power. 120 Other indirect costs
are incurred as a result of the liability regime underlying
the market for gatekeeping services. These costs are ultimately passed on to the beneficiaries of the regime. 121
There also remains the possibility of screening error or
the existence of improper incentives on the part of
intermediaries. Certification services are never perfect,
and rational purchasers may not be capable of properly
assessing the value of such services. 122
The basic argument for disintermediation in the
capital markets takes as its starting point the problems
underlying intermediated sources of capital and, in turn,
suggests that principal actors now have the technological
capacity to internalize many of the functions traditionally performed by market intermediaries. 123 By reducing
their dependence on intermediaries, it is presumed that
prospective issuers can overcome many of the economic
and functional barriers that previously impaired their
ability to raise public equity funds.
To briefly recap the rationale for technological disintermediation in the capital markets context, the provision (or lack thereof) of underwriting services by investment banks creates serious economic and functional
impediments to capital raising by smaller issuers. The
typical SME lacks the resources to make significant direct
investments in reputational capital, while also suffering
from a lack of access to the services of intermediaries
capable of operating as functional surrogates for reputational capital. Introducing a third variable of lingering
suspicion concerning the credibility of new issuers creates a tripartite barrier that effectively discourages the
raising of capital in the public equity markets.

It is important not to fall victim to the excessive
hyperbole concerning the ‘‘promise’’ of technological disntermediation. The concept cannot be perceived as a
anacea; rather, it is a potential tool for realigning the
ditional institutional structure of the offering process
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into a reconstituted version of itself. Technology alone
cannot resolve the numerous obstacles to small business
development posed by the small business capital barrier.
Instead, institutions and actors must be realigned in
order to assist smaller ventures in achieving their ultimate objectives. The technological promise of the
Internet is therefore best seen as a tool for shaping the
parameters of functions that are to be ultimately fulfilled
by human agents. 124 For this reason, it might be more
accurate to describe the desired environment as
‘‘reintermediated’’ 125 rather than disintermediated.
In a functionally reconstituted securities market, the
services traditionally provided by one type of intermediary can be unbundled and subsequently rebundled
into a broader array of ‘‘mix-and-match’’ service bundles
that correspond with the needs of start-up enterprises in
search of financing. 126 As Professor Langevoort accurately
predicted almost two decades ago, the principal actors in
the capital markets are apt to pursue services that provide an efficient means of reducing dependence on an
intermediary. He argued that issuers ‘‘will use underwriters only to the extent that underwriting serves one
or more of the [underwriting] functions more efficiently
than do other methods of achieving the same objectives,
such as direct distribution by the issuer’’. 127

The Internet direct public offering
The Internet direct public offering (DPO) has
recently garnered significant attention for its potential to
reconstitute the functional roles performed by
intermediaries within the contemporary capital markets.
In the last several years, small issuers have attempted to
distribute securities directly over the Internet without
the intermediation of a traditional investment bank. It is
clear that Internet technology can have a significant
impact on redressing the informational asymmetries in
the market by reducing the cost of gathering, analyzing
and disseminating information. 128 However, its effects on
other functional elements of the offering process must be
subject to greater scrutiny. It is generally agreed that the
Internet presents advantages to smaller companies by
reducing offering costs and providing access to investment opportunities heretofore reserved for larger issuers
and investors. 129
The DPO process: new technology and new techniques

Electronic disclosure, the Web-based prospectus, and
Internet roadshows
Perhaps the most obvious benefit of the use of the
Internet in the public offering process is its capacity to
disseminate information to large numbers of prospective
investors instantaneously. The Internet not only provides
investors with expanded access to free or low-cost information, but it also greatly enhances the information provided in traditional disclosure documents. The limita-
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tions inherent in paper-based prospectuses have been
revealed through multimedia disclosure documents that
permit investors to easily proceed from one reference
point to another (including external references) through
the use of hypertext links. 130 The ability to produce and
subsequently amend an electronic prospectus when significant changes occur in the disclosure material can
greatly reduce the cost of producing, printing and distributing paper-based versions of the various documents. 131 Securities regulators have already taken a step
in the direction of electronic disclosure with the introduction of the SEDAR 132 system, which provides a centralized database of public disclosure information.
Annual general meetings are also now frequently conducted in multimedia format, with live meetings being
simultaneously broadcast over the Internet. The Webbased prospectus is the next logical step in electronic
disclosure.

The regulatory response in the United States is to
accept the use of electronic media as ‘‘an equal alternative to the use of paper-based media’’, 133 so long as it
conforms with the general disclosure rules. In Canada,
two National Policies promulgated by the Canadian
Securities Administrators 134 attempt to clarify how
market participants can introduce electronic disclosure
options that comply with existing securities laws. The
approach of both countries has been described as ‘‘regulation by analogy’’: 135 regulators simply apply existing
securities laws to the new electronic delivery mechanisms without drafting substantive alterations to the
system of securities regulation. There has been some
controversy in Canada regarding whether such an
approach is ultimately appropriate, or whether more fundamental legislative recognition of the electronic disclosure process is warranted. 136

Another key development has been the use of the
electronic roadshow. The concept refers to the Webbased format of the travel-based marketing and solicitation campaigns undertaken by company executives and
traditional investment banks. The first electronic roadshow occurred in the United States in 1997, 137 while the
first Canadian attempt occurred in 1998. 138
The advent of the electronic version of the roadshow has partially eroded some of the traditional barriers
that previously hampered smaller companies in the
public offering process. The technique potentially allows
the issuer to reach large numbers of investors, analysts
and money managers at one time without having to
make multiple presentations in disparate locations. 139 It
can be transmitted to its intended audience in either real
time or on a delayed transmission basis, and can incorporate the traditional question and answer sessions
through multiple modes of interaction, including phoneins and e-mail. 140 The process greatly expands the outreach potential of the roadshow process, opening up the
formerly closed-doors of the traditional roadshow to

retail investors and other individuals who are otherwise
unable to physically attend. 141
More important to the present discussion is the
ability of this new medium to reduce the reliance of
issuing companies on the traditional underwriter. Company executives can largely bypass the investment dealer
at this stage, instead offering their own version of the
marketing technique using company executives to
convey the intended message. In larger offerings, the
issuer may nevertheless wish to retain an underwriter for
this process. In such instances, the Internet version of the
roadshow should ultimately reduce the cost of the
underwriter’s services, omitting the time and expense
devoted to travel and the production of multiple
presentations.
The Canadian Securities Administrators have
responded by including provisions regarding Internet
roadshows in National Policy 47-201, which permits
roadshows to be conducted over the Internet provided
that the waiting period requirements of the Securities
Act are satisfied, and that copies of the preliminary prospectus are made available to each viewer prior to the
transmission of the roadshow. Moreover, it provides for
safety features such as password protection and restrictions against retransmission. 142
It is important to note that modern public offerings
will often combine Web-based and traditional activities.
For example, Web-based marketing and solicitation
might be accompanied by traditional marketing techniques such as the publication of a tombstone advertisement in a newspaper; oral presentations to potential
investors might be used in combination with Internet
roadshows and other multimedia presentations. 143

Impact of the Internet on other innovative financing
techniques
The use of the Internet as a vehicle for public offerings also enhances the applicability of other innovative
financing mechanisms. Foremost is the dutch auction,
which is not new, but does receive additional support
through the Internet. The technique allows investors to
make bids on securities, subject to an offering at the
maximum amount they are willing to pay for the stock.
The auctioneer then allocates the securities to the
highest bidders, gradually moving down the bid scale
until the full allocation is sold. 144 The dutch auction
model typically increases both the level of transparency
in the setting of security prices and the efficiency of the
offering process (compared with the firm-commitment
underwriting) for issuers, factors which have led some to
consider the practice a thorn in the side of the investment banks. In the words of one commentator, ‘‘[t]he
auction process takes away the smoke and mirrors of the
investment bankers, and they don’t want to lose their
smoke and mirrors’’. 145 The process has been greatly
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facilitated by the growth of Internet-based ‘‘auctioneers’’
who conduct the auctions on behalf of issuing companies. 146
Institutions and actors: new and reconstituted
The institutions and actors operating in the capital
markets have been forced to adapt to advances in technology. New institutions have emerged to fulfill some of
the market openings presented by the disintermediated
financial environment. Moreover, existing actors have
been forced to reconceptualize their role in the new
marketplace for intermediary services.

New institutions
New services have arisen to fill the partial void created by the disintermediated space. The most common
are the new ‘‘information merchants’’, Web sites created
to advertise a company’s securities in the hopes of soliciting support for a public offering or private placement. 147 Most prominent in the United States, these centralized repositories provide a platform on which
individual users can post standardized information for
electronic distribution. 148 Perhaps the most recognized
institution in this regard has been the Angel Capital
Network (ACE-Net), a listing service for small corporate
issuers to advertise and solicit accredited investors for
private placements of securities. 149 Another popular site
in the United States is run by the Grant Street Group,
which ‘‘creates and maintains customized Web sites for
auctions and other transactions of fixed-income and
equity securities that serve the particular needs of issuers,
dealers, institutional investors, treasurers and global
financial institutions’’. The site has proven to be an effective forum for linking investors with issuers of government debt. 150 The Group has been particularly successful
at linking investors and issuers in purchases of U.S.
municipal and state-level government debt securities. 151
Similar Internet ‘‘matchmaker’’ services have been
created which compile company business plans and
attempt to ‘‘match’’ them with potential investors. These
‘‘cyber-middlemen’’ 152 take on a more active role than
the passive bulletin-board style of other information
merchants by actively attempting to link investors with
investment outlets. Innovations in software technology
can eliminate the free-rider problems previously associated with the profitability of information merchants. 153
Another proposal involves the creation of new stock
markets devoted entirely to the smallest of issuers. For
example, in 1997 the Australian Stock Exchange
‘‘floated’’ a proposal for the creation of an alternative
capital market where unlisted small businesses could
solicit investments. 154
The other major development has been the advent
of Internet-based investment banks, which have
attempted to respond to the demand for direct public
offerings with specialized services for SMEs attempting to
take the plunge. 155 These services challenge the monopo-
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listic dominance of the traditional investment banks by
charging lower fees and creating other value-added services that have begun to alter the previous necessity for
relationship-based banking services. 156 Internet investment banking institutions, while prevalent in the United
States, have not yet taken a firm root in Canada.
Other institutions have emerged that offer to conduct comprehensive marketing and advertising campaigns for prospective issuers, a service that sometimes
extends to assistance with the preparation of the issuer’s
offering materials. 157 Finally, there are also a number of
technology-based companies whose sole objective is to
facilitate the electronic aspects of the Internet DPO,
including the preparation of company Web pages and
the development of Web casts for electronic roadshows.

New roles for traditional actors
Capital market intermediaries, such as securities
lawyers and auditors, should witness their roles expand
beyond the traditional functions accorded to them in
the market for initial public offerings. The ability to
effectively disintermediate using technological advances
and other innovative mechanisms to reduce or eliminate
the role of the underwriter in the process requires other
intermediaries to assume greater responsibilities. The
absence of the most costly intermediary does not preclude the need for gatekeeping services; indeed, the provision of intermediation services remains a functional
necessity. Small issuers still require legal and technical
advice to enable them to complete a successful offering.
Moreover, the provision of gatekeepng services is essential to provide a minimum level of protection for investors that intend to participate in the offering. The practical difference is that now lawyers and auditors must
now undertake the signaling of quality through legal and
informational certification services to a greater degree.
Their ability to successfully fulfill the role of reputational
intermediary is explored in greater detail later in this
paper.
Limitations
A number of problematic issues surrounding the
Internet direct public offering must be acknowledged.
Two of the most prominent involve retail investor protection and the lack of demand for DPO securities.
Because DPOs are undertaken by smaller, unproven
companies — a category which has been historically
over-represented in the area of business failures and
fraudulent market activity — it has been suggested that
the risks of a DPO outweigh the potential benefits.
Moreover, the Internet’s facilitative effect on other forms
of fraudulent business activity has further stigmatized
attempts to conduct an Internet-based offering. Indeed,
the Internet has become a virtual haven for ‘‘pump and
dump’’ operators, who attempt to artificially inflate share
values in order to capitalize on the vulnerability of less-
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sophisticated investors who have been deceived into
purchasing the shares at artificially high levels. 158
It has also been suggested that there is simply a lack
of demand for this type of security. 159 An argument can
be made, however, that the lack of demand correlates
with the perceived absence of an adequate intermediarycertification presence. In other words, there may be a
problem of ‘‘negative signaling’’ in offerings that do not
feature traditional underwriting services. The absence of
an underwriter in a particular offering can be seen to
connote that the offering has been rejected by underwriters due to the perceived substandard quality of the
issuer. This is an argument which is addressed in greater
detail in the final section of this paper, where it is argued
that the negative reputational signaling problem can be
addressed through positive inducements to investor
trust.
Perhaps the greatest impediment to utilizing the
Internet DPO as an innovative and cost-effective
financing method is the increased regulatory burden
faced by issuers who attempt to complete such a transaction. In the recent Canadian attempts at Internet DPOs,
the issuers were required to go through the process of
registering in every province in which the securities were
to be distributed, a factor which added additional fees
and labour to the cost of the offering. Moreover, its very
novelty created regulatory obstacles because cautious
provincial securities regulators reviewed potential DPOs
with enhanced scrutiny. Uniform procedures among the
various jurisdictions for obtaining regulatory approval for
a financing mechanism of this variety do not exist and
securing regulatory approval in each jurisdiction proved
to be an arduous task. The issue became particularly
problematic when smaller provincial securities regulatory agencies were called upon to review the transactions.
Finally, it must be recognized that most offerings of
this type are typically ‘‘one-off’’ transactions, whereby the
company conducts a single financing transaction. The
result is that the prospective issuer depends on its own
Web-based promotional materials to attract investors.
This form of promotional activity relies heavily on a
passive medium: the company Web site. To create a
more vibrant marketplace for new issue DPOs, Canada
would benefit from the establishment of indigenous
third party technology providers such as those that have
proliferated in the United States.
The record (thus far)
To date, only two Internet DPOs have been conducted in Canada. 160 This may be partially due to the
limitations outlined above. However, a broader argument can be made that the appropriate conditions for a
fully-developed market for Internet-based public offerings have not yet been nurtured. The following section
explores the possibility of creating a more hospitable
environment for Internet-based offerings in Canada. It is

argued that other market intermediaries are capable of
developing sufficient reputational capital to act as a surrogate for existing gatekeepers currently entrenched in
the market for advisory services relating to public offerings.

The ‘‘Weakest Link’’:
Establishing Trust in the
Disintermediated Marketplace

T

he expected benefits of technological innovation
must not be permitted to obscure the problems that
remain within the disintermediated marketplace.
Indeed, as the previous part highlighted, a number of
obstacles currently impede the development of an active
market for Internet direct public offerings. The most
pressing problem surrounds redressing the perceived
deficiency in reputational capital among the new and
existing intermediaries that are attempting to fill the
void created by technological disintermediation.
This part argues that the establishment of trust is an
essential component in achieving the full status of
reputational intermediary. The disintermediated space
need not be devoid of trust and reputational inducements to investment. Although the issue of cost is an
important component of the innovative financing techniques, it is important to iterate that the introduction of
Internet direct public offerings must be about more than
simply reducing costs. Instead, it calls for the creation of
a market environment where the decreased cost component of a disintermediated offering is complemented by
reputational and certificational elements that import
legitimacy into the offering. It is possible to envision a
regulatory regime that permits and supports greater flexibility in accessing public equity financing — a regime
that reduces costs while simultaneously signaling quality.
Other intermediaries are capable of developing sufficient reputational capital to act as a surrogate for
existing gatekeepers currently entrenched in the market
for advisory services relating to public offerings. Securities lawyers and auditors are the most prominent examples of intermediaries that are deserving of trust in a
‘‘reintermediated’’ environment.
In order to establish this proposition, it is necessary
to expand the scope of analysis beyond the economic
and legal literature to embrace an interdisciplinary perspective informed by the intersection of law and the
behavioural sciences. As an increasingly varied array of
legal academics have sought recourse to the behavioural
sciences for its predictive and explanatory reach, 161 corporate and securities law scholars have turned to the
social sciences for the empirical grounding of normative
claims concerning the functioning of market institutions.
While economic and financial theory has consistently
been imported into contemporary legal scholarship, the
behavioural theories of cognitive and social psychologists
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have recently challenged some of the orthodox economic presumptions pertaining to rational human behaviour. 162 While not purporting to discount the value of
orthodox economic analysis, this paper attempts to highlight how several components within the field of
behavioural economics can prove useful in guiding
securities regulators, lawyers, and academics to a fuller
understanding of the current limitations on the realization of a functioning disintermediated marketplace for
public offerings of securities.

The concept of trust
The concept of trust is readily comprehensible, yet
difficult to reduce to an accurate narrative description.
The early economic literature on the subject recognized
that informal, unwritten guarantees are preconditions for
trade and production. As Akerlof described in respect of
the market for ‘‘lemons’’, ‘‘[w]here these guarantees are
indefinite, business will suffer’’. 163 Although intelligent
contracting agents are adept at introducing specific contractual provisions to compensate for perceived indeterminacies in the law pertaining to implied contractual
terms, large gaps nevertheless remain in the system of
trust-based protective mechanisms that simply cannot be
closed by drafting terms into agreements or applying
econometric formulas. 164 These issues are relational in
nature and depend on a range of factors that typically
cannot be reduced to writing or legislated into effect.
They require solutions that extend beyond substantive
law to issues of human cognition and behaviour.
The concept of trust is multifaceted and interdisciplinary. In the words of one scholar surveying the various
disciplines:
To trust is . . . to organize our world. This must be at least
partly correct for . . . in the absence of trust a person would
not get out of bed in the morning. Economics teaches us
that trust saves transaction costs. Sociology, politics, and psychology teach us that to trust is to be willing to enter into
relationships and accept the authority and will of others. To
trust is, in my own field of corporate law, to be willing to
invest your money in a corporation managed by people you
have never seen, you have never met, about whom you
know very little, and some of whose names you may not
know at all. 165

Although the various disciplines approach the topic from
differing perspectives, there are several general points of
agreement. The first is that by definition, the concept of
trust is concerned with the intentions and incentives of
the trusted. 166 The second is that trust’s basic function is
to reduce the uncertainty and complexity of life; the
mechanisms of trust assist us by extrapolating from previous experiences when faced with new situations 167 and
guide us in making rational choices based upon those
prior experiences.
The creation of trust involves impounding past
practices and decisions into current and anticipated life
experiences. To create trust is therefore to establish a
system of norms and values, grounded in patterns of

social interaction that are conducive to cooperation
rather than conflict. 168 Groups of people who are capable
of ‘‘embedding’’ such norms are more capable of trusting
than those that are not, or they will at the very least
create a system of beliefs that enables them to make
certain judgments concerning whether or not to trust. 169
A problem arises because the process of establishing
trust can be costly. The establishment of trust imposes
costs; however, the introduction of cost-saving measures
can increase efficiency and ultimately reduce long-term
costs. In order to reduce the ultimate costs of trusting,
private sector institutions operating as professional gatekeepers have been established to uphold the norms and
values that are important to the immediate society. However, to be effective and legitimate, these gatekeeping
institutions must be regulated by higher-order gatekeepers. In essence, public law supports private trust by
punishing deviations from trustworthy behaviour. 170 In
turn, trustworthy behaviour is rewarded, both privately
through the creation of the trustworthy ‘‘reputation’’,
and publicly through the institutionalization and legalization of gatekeeping norms. In essence, therefore, the
dilemma can be reduced to one of organizing the public
and private provision of gatekeeping services into a
system of public and private incentives that is optimal to
the establishment of trust in a given environment.
In the context of the present discussion, further variables must be considered that do not mitigate but rather
add dimensions to the problems underlying the concept
of trust. First, it must be recognized that the establishment of trust in the securities law context can be particularly ‘‘expensive’’. In securities law, the concept of trust is
fiercely interwoven with the ingrained issues of informational asymmetries and the gatekeeping intermediaries
that are responsible for transforming the informational
opacity of a particular issuer into a transparent and therefore calculable variable. Of particular concern is the insecurity engendered by the inability to accept the role of
particular intermediaries in rectifying informational deficiencies. Moreover, there is a select group of market
actors who thrive on the absence of trust. These individuals specifically attempt to capitalize on the standard
dialectic of risk and return (i.e., the ‘‘possibility of aboveaverage return inevitably carries with it above average
risk’’), a factor that can compromise the foundations of
trust. 171
Second, the variable of transacting in cyberspace
adds a further element of expense. In cyberspace, the rule
of law is not fully entrenched. The cyberspace domain
has also not yet witnessed the introduction of fullyenforceable non-legal sanctions. ‘‘Reputation’’ does not
yet carry the same pedigree in the world of cyberspace as
it does in the tangible world of shopping centres, automobile dealerships or investment banks. Reputation
cannot easily attach to an entity that is devoid of a tangible (or at least readily-identifiable) personal identity. 172
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Developing trust-based intermediaries for
Internet DPOs: The gatekeeper liability
regime revisited
There is no uniform prescription for establishing
trust. 173 Because the concept is fluid and case-specific, the
appropriate trust-building mechanisms are malleable
and contextual in nature. However, because the establishment of trust is largely dependent on the intentions
of the trusted, a reconstituted gatekeeper liability regime
will be most effective where the intermediary has a stake
in the process, measured as the threat of formal or
informal sanction for non-trustworthy behaviour.
Devising the appropriate gatekeeper liability regime
requires the efficient reorganization of public and private
incentives and sanctioning activity in order to establish
an environment conducive to trust-building. Reputational sanctions should be the primary device for ‘‘regulating’’ the market for gatekeeping services, but they
should be supported by public law mechanisms that
punish those that deviate from trustworthy behaviour. 174
The formal regulatory regime should remain responsive
to investor fears of negligent and malfeasant behaviour
on the part of issuers and intermediaries, and should
continue to afford statutory civil liability for misrepresentation and the various other regulatory sanctions currently in place. The statutory due diligence requirements
should not be relaxed, as this would negate the role of
the gatekeeper’s role of investor protection. Rather, the
due diligence standard should reflect the context of the
new investigatory environment and attempt to balance
the competing policy factors of investor protection and
small business development. 175 It is also important to
recognize that statutory liability regimes are imperfect,
and carry the baggage associated with the possibility of
mistake, inflexibility, and regulatory capture. 176
Common law rules, although imprecise and subject
to abuse should nevertheless remain a secondary component of a responsible gatekeeper liability regime. These
public sector roles are not fully adequate in their current
form. The common law standard for determining negligent misrepresentation claims 177 must be refined
through continuing judicial interpretation to import
greater certainty to the question of gatekeeper liability. It
is not acceptable that auditor liability for negligent misstatements be precluded solely on the basis of policy
concerns such as the spectre of indeterminate liability.
Indeed, the common law must incorporate the policy
objectives of investor protection and greater access to
capital for SMEs. On the other hand, expanded common
law causes of action against gatekeepers are also open to
abuse. Access to civil actions against gatekeepers can
create a surge in opportunistic behaviour by disgruntled
investors. While protection must be afforded to investors
who have suffered at the hands of a negligent gatekeeper,
unscrupulous investors must not be provided with the
ability to opportunistically initiate groundless claims
against intermediaries that have not breached their pro-

fessional or transactional responsibilities. Enhanced judicial scrutiny of existing intermediaries will be necessary
to stimulate positive incentives to investment in a
reintermediated space. This is a topic that is deserving of
specific attention and is one that cannot be adequately
addressed within the parameters of this paper. It is
deserving of mention, however, that the Ontario government has recently responded to concerns over inadequate public regulation of capital market intermediaries
by drafting a proposed statutory cause of action against
‘‘experts’’. 178

Establishing (private) trust in market
gatekeepers
Private sector gatekeepers such as lawyers and auditors are sophisticated actors that are deserving of trust in
a reintermediated capital market environment. It is difficult to prescribe concrete mechanisms for signaling their
quality to the investing public, but several factors that
contribute to their reputable stature can be highlighted.
First, securities lawyers and auditors, like investment
banks, have an existing reputation in the capital markets.
As repeat market participants, they have developed the
necessary knowledge and skills to perform a vast array of
complicated tasks and are sensitive to reputational sanction. They have consistently acted both to counsel the
actions of clients and to certify information emanating
from the client. Moreover, their extensive knowledge of
the offering process combined with legal and non-legal
sanctions for negligence have created a practice environment in which they are willing to outsource services for
which their current skill-levels prove inadequate to
accommodate. Hubris will be checked by the spectre of
liability, measured in reputational and other forms of
public and private sanctions. Moreover, because they are
repeat players in the markets and therefore have a vested
interest in maintaining their reputational character, they
are less likely to participate in the unscrupulous acts that
are of foremost concern to the investing public.
Second, the specific codes of professional conduct
and general ethical obligations of lawyers and the
accounting profession are recognized ‘‘reputationforming devices’’, and reduce the risks associated with
trusting. 179 Mandatory participation in a provincial law
society or accreditation with the Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants carries with it a number of ethical and professional requirements that members must
uphold. The legitimacy of these self-governing organizations is anchored in their ability to monitor and alter the
behaviour of their members.
Finally, there are an increasing number of forums
that monitor the credibility and trustworthiness of these
intermediaries. In addition to the existing informal channels through which the existence (or lack) of ‘‘reputation’’ and ‘‘quality’’ indicators are communicated
between private parties, specialized publications track
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the intermediary industries in great detail. Moreover, the
Internet provides generalized access to a wealth of information on the behaviour and reputations of lawyers and
law firms through various Web sites and bulletin board
services.
Additional steps are necessary to fulfill the role of
gatekeeper in the public offering process. For example,
securities lawyers must begin to accept the risk of
expanded legal liability and reputational sanction by
providing more comprehensive due diligence opinions
in offering documents. Under normal circumstances,
lawyers typically refrain from offering ‘‘negative comfort’’
opinions 180 and other expansive positive factual representations in the context of rendering an opinion. In a
disintermediated offering, the lawyer’s expanded role
requires that the positive factual representations remain
in the disclosure materials. The opinions must be honest
and forthright, and they must be present in the offering
materials. Without such representations, the spectre of
mistrust might loom large over the offering. The lawyer’s
traditional stamp of approval provides a positive statement to investors that there has been ‘‘no cheating’’, a
factor which is ‘‘an important and direct supplement to
the other means of verification offered to the buyer’’. 181
Lawyers must therefore begin to cross over into
uncharted territory — assuming a greater level of responsibility by making more positive factual representations
regarding the issuer. Such representations must be
grounded in their investigation of the issuer and subject,
of course, to protections for the lawyer in the case of the
issuer’s intentional misrepresentations or other misleading practices during the investigation. Such protections are similar to those afforded to auditors who disclaim against direct internal misrepresentations on the
part of clients.
It is expected that law firms with the ability to make
such representations will charge a premium fee for such
a service 182 in order to compensate for their increased
exposure to sanction, although the cost value of the service will remain substantially lower than the costs levied
for similar services by an underwriter.
Moreover, it is expected that the reputational
quality of some lawyers will be naturally discounted. For
example, in-house counsel will be seen to lack the necessary level of independence 183 required of an effective
gatekeeper, and the trust value of their services will be
discounted accordingly. Also, non-specialists (i.e., lawyers
that do not concentrate on corporate and securities law
matters) will not be capable of signaling trust in the same
manner as specialists.
Although it has been suggested that the natural
result of this reputational shift is that law firms will
exclude higher-risk clientele from the services that they
provide, 184 an argument can be made that this position is
short-sighted. The function of the intermediary is to
attest to the quality of information disclosure, not the
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quality of the issuer as an investment vehicle; as long as
the information disclosed is accurate and not misleading,
the intermediary has performed its role in reducing the
informational asymmetry between the issuer and
investor. The decision of whether to invest thereafter
rests on the investor and/or its professional advisors.
Accountants similarly must be prepared to expand
their functional role and accept responsibility for more
intensive analysis and discussion regarding the financial
affairs of the issuer, where available and applicable. 185
Indeed, recent events in the United States have highlighted the role of auditors in precipitating calamitous
economic events. 186 Overt malfeasance among a select
group of malefactors has led to enhanced scrutiny of
auditor behaviour by public and private sector actors.
Finally, we must not forget that other intermediaries
(i.e., venture capital firms) may have played a prominent
role in the development of an SME prior to its publicoffering phase. Their role must not be discounted and
must be taken into consideration when the quality of the
offering is in question. Individual VCs and other private
equity firms may be subject to differing reputational or
quality characteristics, but their presence in nurturing
the prospective issuer throughout its gestation period
provides an additional valuable resource, and provides a
further grounding upon which to found a solid bedrock
of trust.

Conclusion

T

he prospect of enhancing access to the capital markets for SMEs is within reach. Achieving this objective would contribute meaningfully to the productive
allocation of resources in the national economy. The
technological disintermediation of the capital markets
has been described as an evolutionary process that has
the power to reduce many of the barriers currently
impeding access to capital. Technological innovation
alone, however, is not sufficient to effect such change. To
be ultimately successful, a reconstituted capital market
for SME finance must permit new and existing
intermediaries to step in and partially fill the vacuum left
by the reduction or elimination of the functional role of
the underwriter. To accomplish this goal, an environment of trust must be nurtured, in which these newly
reconstituted intermediaries are capable of achieving sufficient reputational status to signal to investors the requisite level of quality and confidence in the investment
securities under consideration. Capital market participants that are unable or unwilling to foster the conditions necessary to establish trust must be prepared to
accept the alternative for smaller offerings: added costs,
underpricing, inefficiency, and ultimately, lack of access
to the capital markets.
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SME, but will defer to the various definitions provided below as constitutive of an acceptable range of possible indicators. As the recent Ontario
Securities Commission Task Force on Small Business Financing has noted:
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as one with between 50 and 100 employees. The Canadian Federation of Independent Business uses a definition of fewer than 20
employees and/or a chartered bank lending Facility of less than
$500,000 . . . In a recent study completed by the Conference Board
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(Ontario Securities Commission, Task Force on Small Business
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